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1 Introduction
The persistence of disparate educational, economic, financial and health outcomes between social
groups defined along racial, ethnic, gender or religious lines has been a long standing concern for
public policy in many countries across the world. Scholars in fields ranging from anthropology to
sociology to criminal justice have consequently employed a variety of disciplinary perspectives to
attempt to understand the forces - whether legal, social, institutional, behavioural or political - that
generate and sustain such gaps in outcomes between members of different social groups (Dohan
2003; Hirsch 1983; Lamb 2005; Pager and Shepherd 2008)
While acknowledging the possible role of innate or learned differences in ability or preferences
between groups, discrimination against marginalized or historically disadvantaged groups by mem-
bers of more powerful groups is widely held to be a plausible source of at least some (and sometimes
a major) part of observed inter-group differences. Indeed, at least since Becker (1957), economists
have sought to understand, establish, and quantify the possible role of discrimination to explain
relatively worse outcomes among members of marginalized/disadvantaged groups, racial or ethnic
minorities, and women. The outcomes studied include employment, wages, access to credit, job
performance, housing patterns, occupational choice etc (Aigner and Cain 1977; Altonji and Blank
1999; Arrow et al. 1973; Bertrand and Mullainathan 2003; Blau and Kahn 2006; Blau and Ferber
1987).
Within this broad area of research, a growing literature focuses on the existence, drivers and
magnitude of discrimination in housing markets (Choi et al. 2005; Galster 1991; Turner et al. 2002).
Motivated at least in part by a large literature that links housing discrimination to a variety of
adverse social and economic consequences for marginalized groups, including worsening residential
segregation (Denton 1999; South and Crowder 1998), poorer educational and employment outcomes
(Yinger 1995), and lower rates of saving (Kain and Quigley 1972), this body of research seeks to
quantify the extent of such discrimination and understand what drives it. These thus emerge as
key questions for further research.
As with the study of discrimination in other domains (see for instance, Bertrand and Mul-
lainathan (2003), and Banerjee et al. (2009) for labor markets), the difficulty of clearly attributing
some or all of the observed differences in housing outcomes between groups to discrimination against
individuals belonging to those groups using observational data alone has led economists to use ex-
perimental methods, including audit studies, to more clearly identify the role of discrimination.1
While the bulk of such audit studies have been carried out in developed countries (Ahmed and
Hammarstedt 2008; Andersson et al. 2012; Choi et al. 2005; Yinger 1995), a small but growing
number of audit studies have by now been carried out in developing countries.
In India, discrimination is a salient issue for policy. There are persistent differences in key
outcomes between various social groups differentiated by religion as well as caste - historically the
primary axis of social differentiation in South Asia (Beteille 1992). A growing body of literature
1See Fix and Struyk (1993) for an overview of this research for the United States.
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has begun to quantify caste based discrimination in labor markets (Banerjee et al. 2009; Deshpande
2011; Siddique 2011; Thorat and Neuman 2012). There are several historical and anthropological
accounts of enforced housing segregation along caste lines (Beteille et al. 1969; Dumont 1980;
Ghurye 1961; Srinivas 1957). There is considerable anecdotal evidence, some of which has received
widespread media coverage, about the existence of discrimination against Muslims, the country’s
largest religious minority.2
However, until recently there has been little experimental evidence on the extent to which reli-
gious and caste minorities in India experience housing discrimination. To the best of our knowledge,
there is only one published experimental study of housing discrimination in India. Thorat et al.
(2015) use a variety of audit techniques to document the differential treatment of Muslims and
Scheduled Castes in the housing market of India’s national capital region. We conduct a web-based
audit of the market for rental properties offered directly by owners/landlords using a sample of 170
rental properties in the Delhi region. Our findings complement and extend the results in Thorat
et al. (2015) by adopting a different experimental strategy to generate what we argue are likely
cleaner measures of differential treatment attributable only to perceived differences in caste and
religion.
First, rather than employ a face-to-face or telephonic audit as in Thorat et al. (2015), we
use a strictly impersonal, web-based approach that involves no interaction whatsoever between
the fictitious tenants and prospective landlords. Following Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) and
Banerjee et al. (2009) we argue that this generates greater confidence that any measured differences
are not driven by investigator or enumerator effort, affect, presentation, etc. Our study should thus
provide more accurate estimates of the effect of caste/religion than a telephonic or face-to-face
audit.
This choice is not costless: we can only use measures based on landlords’ call patterns, unlike
Thorat et al. (2015) who can measure, for example, the kinds of properties prospective tenants
are steered towards. Given the trend globally to generate data on discrimination using the kind
of impersonal audit we use here, however, we argue below that this tradeoff is worth making. At
the very least, our results should be seen as extending those in Thorat et al. (2015) by providing
a cleaner, albeit more limited-scope, measure of discrimination in housing markets that can be
compared to their results from in-person and telephonic audits.
Second, while the “resume audit” literature typically restricts itself to measuring whether or
not landlords contact potential tenants from different social groups at different rates using a binary
variable, we can also measure how many times, in what order, and at what intervals landlords
contact tenants. Our experimental set-up thus permits us to derive plausible continuous measures
of landlord interest, effort, and persistence in calling back tenancy applicants of different castes
2See “They Said We Don’t Give Flats to Muslims, Alleges 25-Year-Old Woman in Mumbai”, http://www.ndtv.
com/india-news/they-said-we-dont-give-flats-to-muslims-alleges-25-year-old-woman-in-mumbai-766353,
accessed on May 27, 2015; and “Denied Flat Because She’s Muslim, Delhi Academic Asks Kejriwal for Help”, http://
thewire.in/2015/07/24/video-denied-flat-because-shes-muslim-delhi-academic-asks-kejriwal-for-help-7165/,
accessed on July 24, 2015.
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and religions.
Third, we are able to estimate whether the extent of measured discrimination varies by neigh-
bourhood quality, apartment size, and landlord background, subject to the usual caveat of dimin-
ishing statistical power.
Finally, our study contributes towards understanding discrimination in online markets which are
becoming increasingly pervasive. Landlords may be plausibly more comfortable with discriminating
in such settings due to the anonymous and impersonal nature of contact . We find strong evidence
of discrimination against Muslim applicants, both in terms of probability of being contacted and
the number of contacts. Where the probability that a landlord contacts an upper-caste applicant is
0.35, this is only 0.22 for a Muslim applicant. A Muslim applicant must respond to 45.5 listings to
receive 10 landlord callbacks, while an UC applicant must respond to only 28.6 listings to receive
the same number. This points to a significant disadvantage faced by Muslim applicants relative to
upper-caste Hindus, who must expend significantly more effort to find housing. In contrast, we fail
to find statistically significant evidence of bias against Scheduled Castes (SC) or Other Backward
Classes (OBC). However, we discuss how our estimates may understate the true differentials in
callback ratios as a result of our failure to perfectly link all callbacks to a listing.
In other notable results, we find some suggestive evidence that landlords wait longer to call
Muslim (and to a lesser extent Scheduled Caste) applicants back after receiving a query from
them than they do to call back upper-caste Hindus. We also find some heterogeneity in landlord
responses to applicant types. Most significantly, landlords offering 1-bedroom properties are 20%
points less likely to respond to Muslims. As a rule, applicants to 1-bedroom properties tend to be
single men or women. Since all our applicants are male, this implies that the housing rental market
is especially hostile to single Muslim men. Also, Muslim landlords are no more likely to respond to
Muslim applicants.
The plan of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 draws upon a large literature in
economics, social anthropology and law to motivate studying housing discrimination in general.
Section 3 considers the case of India, arguing that housing discrimination is an important policy
question in general but particularly in India, where there is both a history of enforced housing
segregation by caste and contemporary anecdotal evidence of discrimination against religious mi-
norities and some caste groups. Section 4 situates this study within the literature on this issue in
India. Section 5 describes the audit exercise. Section 6 presents key descriptive statistics. Section 7
describes the key results. Section 8 discusses their significance, the implications for future research,
and concludes.
2 Literature Review: Housing Discrimination Globally
Besides labor and credit markets, a large and growing sub-set of the literature on the causes of
divergent socio-economic outcomes between social groups focuses on the existence, drivers and
magnitude of discrimination in housing markets (Choi et al. 2005; Turner et al. 2002). The theo-
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retical justification for this literature arises in the first instance from considerations of fairness and
the right of individuals and households to live where they choose (Danziger and Lin 2000; Massey
and Denton 1993) but also from policy imperatives arising from the recognition of the effects of
discriminatory housing practices on a variety of outcomes. Given existing spatial inequalities in the
quality of public services in most countries, housing discrimination limits the ability of individuals
and households from disadvantaged groups to access quality schooling and healthcare, which in
turn affects their schooling, labor and credit market outcomes, and could therefore lead to the
persistence of measured inter-group inequality (Galster 1991; Yinger 1995).
As with other forms of discrimination (e.g., discrimination in labor and credit markets), it is
difficult for researchers to infer unequal treatment in the housing market from aggregate data alone,
since some relevant characteristics of applicants may be visible to potential employers, lenders or
landlords but unknown to the researcher. As a result, studies that decompose observed outcomes by
observable applicant characteristics risk finding biased results, where a portion of the variation that
is in fact due to some characteristic of the applicant unobservable to the researcher but observable
to the landlord or interviewer is erroneously attributed to discrimination (Altonji and Blank 1999).
Econometrically, such studies are the canonical case of omitted variable bias.
Researchers have sough to mitigate this bias by employing a variety of econometric techniques,
such as instrumental variables etc. Beyond this, researchers studying discrimination have used
quasi-experimental approaches. An influential quasi-experiment in the field of workplace discrimi-
nation is Goldin and Rouse (2000), which uses the effect of the introduction of blind auditions into
orchestra hiring on women musicians’ hiring outcomes to measure gender discrimination.
However, the dominant response of researchers - whether in labor, credit or housing markets -
to the problems with observational studies is to turn to experimentation. Experimental approaches
in the field of discrimination have centered on audit studies. In the area of labor discrimination,
researchers have used hiring audits, where comparable minority and non-minority candidates are
sent to actual interviews to measure the existence and extent of differential treatment (Altonji and
Blank 1999). These studies are closely related to “mystery shopping” studies of various kinds (e.g.
Mullainathan et al. (2012) on the market for financial advice) where trained actors are enlisted to
model various characteristics or needs for a service provider.
The counterparts of these studies in the case of housing markets are housing audits, where
researchers send actors from different groups of interest who are trained to otherwise present as
identical and follow pre-set scripts, in order to measure differences in the apartments or houses
they are shown, rental prices quoted, and of course ability to rent. Such systematic audit or
correspondence studies have played an important role in enabling researchers to measure the extent
of discrimination against minorities in housing markets in the United States (Choi et al. 2005;
Yinger 1995) more credibly than would be possible using aggregate data. In the United States
in particular, these studies have been institutionalized by the Department of Housing and Urban
Development which sponsors regular housing audits in many large metropolitan areas in order to
be able to track temporal and spatial changes in minorities’ outcomes in the housing market (e.g.,
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Turner et al. (2002)).
Audit studies clearly offer many advantages over cross-sectional analyses. However, as Bertrand
and Mullainathan (2003) point out in the context of labor market discrimination, they have at
least one major shortcoming. The fact that actors are aware of the purpose of the experiment
(i.e., that the experiment is not and cannot be double-blind) increases the inherent difficulty of
ensuring the absence of observational differences between mock job candidates in a pair and could
therefore introduce error into the estimates of discrimination. For instance, actors of different races
may (perhaps subconsciously) behave differently, triggering different behaviours on the part of the
landlord than if they had truly been “identical”.
These shortcomings have led researchers to devise what we will call “impersonal” or “auto-
mated” audit studies (with resume audits a la Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) being a prime
example), where researchers vary the perceived group membership of a fictitious applicant (for a
job or an apartment) without enlisting actors to interact with the potential employer, landlord, or
other service provider. These studies rely on the ability to apply remotely for jobs or apartments
using mail or internet-based applications. As Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) and Banerjee et
al. (2009) note for resume audits, these studies are able to provide the cleanest possible evidence of
differential treatment but only for a much earlier stage of the hiring process. In the labor-market
case this means that they can only measure whether a potential employer called an applicant back,
and not whether the potential employee was in fact offered a job, or what salary was offered.
Nonetheless, as Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) note, “to the extent that the search process
has even moderate frictions, one would expect that reduced interview rates would translate into
reduced job offers”.
The growth of classifieds and internet-based housing portals, which make it possible for a
potential tenant to express interest in an apartment or house offered for rent without interacting
with the putative landlord either in person or over the telephone, has made it possible to implement
such “remote” audits in the housing market. Ahmed and Hammarstedt (2008) and Andersson et
al. (2012) are prominent examples of such studies in a developed country context. As rental
housing markets in urban parts of developing countries such as India increasingly migrate online,
the importance of carefully measuring the existence, magnitude and drivers of discrimination in
these online markets acquires greater importance.
As in the case of labor-market discrimination studies, such audits in the case of housing markets
must restrict themselves to measuring an early-stage outcome (i.e., whether the landlord applied to
responded to a potential tenant’s expression of interest) without being able to measure differences in
downstream outcomes such as what apartments were offered or the terms on which apartments were
made available. Nonetheless, as in the case of resume audits, impersonal housing audits do provide
the cleanest possible evidence of differential treatment of different categories of people seeking
housing of all study methods. And, building upon the argument in Bertrand and Mullainathan
(2003), we argue that the existence of search frictions means that those from groups that receive
fewer landlord callbacks are also likely to be offered fewer houses, or to take longer to find a house
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that meets their requirements. Furthermore, it is worth noting that a study such as ours, which
focuses on the differential rates at which prospective tenants from different social groups are able to
“get a foot in the door” using web-based housing portals, is increasingly a better approximation of
how those seeking housing in urban settings in developing countries go about searching for housing
as rental housing markets increasingly migrate onto these online platforms than studies that utilize
face-to-face or telephonic audits, which abstract from the difficulty of obtaining such a meeting or
conversation in the first place.
In what follows, we argue for the relevance of these considerations in the study of housing
markets in urban India, and put the contributions of the present study in the context of the
existing literature on this topic.
3 Housing Discrimination in India: Theoretical Considerations,
Historical Experience
There are several reasons that suggest, a priori, that discrimination might impinge upon the results
of certain categories of individuals’ or families’ quests to rent or buy housing in India. Further,
it appears ex ante likely that such discrimination may be faced both by individuals who occupy a
historically subordinate position within the hierarchy of caste, the complex system of hierarchical
social relations that long governed, and in important ways still governs some aspects of Indian
society (notably marriage, see Banerjee et al. (2013)), and/or by Muslims.
First, the strong correlations between caste and religion and socio-economic status, occupational
choice, housing outcomes, etc. seen in the data suggest a possible role for discrimination against
members of these groups along some or all of these dimensions.3 In general, upper-caste Hindus
have better economic outcomes than both non-upper-caste Hindus (including but not limited to
Scheduled Castes and the Other Backward Classes or OBCs) and Muslims.4
Using data from India’s National Sample Survey, a nationally representative repeat cross-
sectional household survey, Deshpande (2005) provides a detailed account of levels and patterns of
consumption expenditure (used as a proxy for income in the absence of reliable income data) by
social group over a twenty-year period. She finds that Scheduled Castes/Tribes (SC/ST) have lower
per capita consumption expenditure than other groups, and while each social group’s consumption
expenditure has risen over the twenty-year period studied, the increase is lower for SC/ST than the
rest of the population. Deshpande (2001) uses five indicators of standard of living (land holding,
occupation, education, ownership of consumer durables, and of livestock to construct a “Caste
Development Index” (CDI), and finds that in the early 1990s, there was no state where the CDI
of SC/ST populations was higher than that of non-SC/ST populations. Desai and Dubey (2012)
3The argument here draws heavily on Banerjee et al. (2009).
4Apart from a small (albeit culturally and economically powerful) elite descended from the Arab- or Persian-origin
dominant ruling and administrative classes of medieval and pre-colonial India, most Indian Muslims are descended
from members of the lower Hindu castes who converted to Islam to escape discrimination or to better their economic
prospects (but who, in many cases, continue to follow the caste-ordained occupations of their Hindu forebears).
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analyze data from a nationally representative survey of 41,554 households conducted in 2005 to
argue that there continue to be persistent disparities in education, income and social networks by
caste. There are also persistent disparities in housing quality. According to the 2011 Census, only
34% of SC households have a latrine on the premises, compared with 46.7% of all households in
the country (Office of the Registrar General and Census Commissioner 2012).
The existence of affirmative action for members of the Scheduled Castes, Tribes and Other
Backward Classes necessitates official data-collection about these groups. Since there is no such
national policy for Muslims, data on Hindu-Muslim differentials are more sparse. Nevertheless,
what data there are is suggestive. For example, while the widespread prevalence of disguised
unemployment or underemployment in developing countries limit the utility of official measures of
unemployment, it is striking that both Scheduled Castes and Muslims are over-represented among
those whom the Indian state classifies as “marginal workers” - those employed for less than 6
months of the prior year. This figure is 10.9% for Scheduled Castes and 6.5% for Muslims, while it
is 3.5% for the country as a whole (Banerjee et al. 2009). According to the Sachar Committee, a
government committee set up to probe the socio-economic status of Muslims in India, Muslims had
the highest unemployment rate of any socio-religious group in India (Sachar 2006). Shariff (1995),
one of the few analyses of socio-economic differentials between Hindus and Muslims in India, finds
that 22% of Muslims had a monthly household per capita expenditure of less than Rs.110 in 1987-88,
compared with 13.1% of Hindus. It is worth noting that given well-documented caste differentials
within the Hindu population, the difference between Muslims and the non-Scheduled Caste/Tribe
Hindu population would likely be even higher.
Secondly, the nature of caste and religion in India lend strong a priori plausibility to the idea
that members of lower-caste and minority groups are likely to face discrimination in the housing
market in particular. Along with restrictions on commensality, inter-marriage, education and oc-
cupational choice, housing segregation is central to the logic of caste (Beteille et al. 1969; Dumont
1980; Ghurye 1961; Srinivas 1957). Just as there were restrictions on inter-dining and inter-marriage
between members of “higher” and “lower” castes (particularly those belonging to the groups for-
merly referred to as Untouchable and, since Independence as Scheduled Castes), housing in most
Indian villages and towns was organized along caste and community lines to conform with strongly
held notions of purity and pollution where the presence of certain groups within a certain distance
of higher-status groups was held to be polluting. For example, most Indian villages had hamlets
occupied by members of specific caste groups (such as the “Agraharam”, or the “Brahmin” quarter
of traditional Tamil villages and towns) with those lower in the social hierarchy often being pro-
hibited from entering the parts of the village occupied by those ostensibly of ”higher” status, and
from using the same places of worship, sources of drinking water, or other public facilities as the
latter.
Thirdly, while modernization and urbanization have loosened the ties of caste and clan so that
large Indian cities contain many neighborhoods that are, at least in theory, available to anyone who
can afford to live there, there is considerable anecdotal evidence that members of India’s Muslim
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community (and, to some extent, other religious minorities), some linguistic groups, and those
belonging to the Scheduled Caste or Other Backward Classes (historically disadvantaged groups
whose members are eligible for some forms of positive discrimination in education and public-sector
employment) continue to face difficulties in accessing the housing of their choice. For example, there
have been a series of media reports that present cases where even upwardly-mobile, middle-class,
professional or elite Muslims face discrimination when they look for housing, even in India’s biggest
cities.5
And while relatively little media attention focuses on SCs and OBCs, it is plausible that Sched-
uled Castes and Other Backward Castes - both groups whose members have historically been
considered “unclean” or “inferior” by dominant caste groups, and who were traditionally not al-
lowed to live in the same areas as those from more powerful group - would face similar hurdles.
For example, preliminary results from a recent nationally representative household survey of over
40,000 households show that 52% of Brahmins and 24% of non-Brahmin “upper-caste” households
practiced untouchability either directly, or in that they were hesitant to admit a member of the
Scheduled Castes into the kitchen (NCAER 2014). Indeed, Vithayathil and Singh (2012) find that
segregation by caste is greater than that by class in all seven Indian mega-cities that they study.
4 Existing Literature on Housing Discrimination in India
As in other countries, spatial inequalities in the provision of public services (e.g., schools, hospitals,
roads, etc.) and the signalling role of an individual’s address mean that being unable to access the
housing and area of one’s choice is (quite apart from being unjust) a cause of other persistent gaps
(such as in educational attainment, health status, and employment status.) Housing discrimination
is thus a policy concern. Reliable evidence on housing discrimination in India emerges as a matter
of importance if these problems are to be addressed.
However, although Vithayathil and Singh (2012) argue for the relevance of audit studies to
the research agenda on urban housing and patterns of residential segregation in India, there is a
surprising paucity of rigorous empirical evidence on this issue, with Thorat et al. (2015), which
experimentally measures the extent of discrimination against non-upper-caste Hindus and Muslims
in the city of Delhi and its suburbs using face-to-face and telephonic audits, being a notable
exception.
Our study builds on this study but differs along some important dimensions, which we discuss
in detail later, but which have to do both with the nature of the experiment we implement and
the measures of landlord interest and effort we are able to capture and analyse. Briefly, our
audit methodology manipulates perceived applicant identity through the names used on web-based
applications for rental housing to ensure that inadvertent and unconscious experimenter effects do
not bias the results of the audit, thus side-stepping some lingering concerns with audit studies that
5See “Shutting Out the Other”, http://www.thehindu.com/features/magazine/
task-of-house-hunting-in-india-becomes-complicated-if-you-dont-belong-to-the-right-religion/
article7286237.ece accessed on September 18, 2015.
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rely on live subjects and/or telephonic conversations with landlords.
Secondly, we exploit the fact that landlords can and do call back potential tenants multiple
times, and that we can track the times of their calls, to develop measures of landlord interest and
effort. For instance, we can measure not just whether landlords were more likely to call back upper-
caste tenants than Muslims or Scheduled Castes, but also whether they were more likely to call
back the former more frequently, or sooner, or more persistently. The nature of our experiment thus
leads to a rich set of observable and quantifiable landlord behaviours which we exploit to deepen
our analysis beyond a simple analysis of callback rates. Since we have information on features of
advertised houses, and can infer some limited information about landlords from their names, we
can also test for interactions between landlord and apartment characteristics and callbacks.
5 The Experiment
This section describes our experimental strategy in greater detail.
5.1 Location and Sample
Our experiment, which was carried out entirely remotely, exploited one of India’s most popular
online housing search platforms. Over the course of a roughly two-month period in the summer
of 2015, we regularly scanned the most recently posted rental listings for Delhi and its two largest
contiguous suburbs on this website and identified a convenience sample of 171 listings posted directly
by landlords (i.e., not ones posted by an agent from a rental or property agency), taking care to
avoid sending more than one set of applications to a given landlord in order to avoid arousing any
suspicions that would result if a landlord received an application in two rounds of sending and
noticed that the same number was now attached to a different name.
The landlords in our study were seeking tenants for apartments or houses in India’s capital and
second-largest city, Delhi, and its two largest contiguous suburbs, Gurgaon in the neighboring state
of Haryana and the New Okhla Industrial Development Area, usually referred to as NOIDA, in the
neighboring state of Uttar Pradesh.
These three administrative units form the core of what is known as the National Capital Region
(or NCR), which is envisaged by urban planners as eventually constituting a single commuter zone
centered on the national capital, Delhi. While the entire NCR extends in a wide arc around the
city and is not yet a fully realized vision, the three areas in our study are in many ways a single
economic entity since they are connected by recently built expressways, and the same rail-based
mass transit system, the Delhi Metro. The development of the Metro and the growth of many
service- and manufacturing-sector industries in NOIDA and Gurgaon have led to a substantial
population, particularly of middle-class white-collar workers, who live in one city of the three and
work in another. For the purposes of our study, it is thus reasonable to think of these three
administrative units as constituting a single housing market with several sub-regions (South, East,
West and North Delhi, Gurgaon and NOIDA to a first approximation).
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Although the behavior of agents is interesting in its own right, we chose to focus on landlords for
this initial study since doing so avoids any potential issues with principal-agent problems arising,
for example, from agents having imperfect information about landlords’ preferences.6 While no
explicit attempt was made at representativeness, the final counts of apartments applied to in each
part of the city should be broadly indicative of rental housing flows in those areas, since we sampled
the most recent landlord-posted advertisements in each region.7
5.2 Names and Contact Strategy
As discussed above, past research suggests that both Scheduled Castes and Muslims, as well as
individuals belonging to the type loosely known as Other Backward Classes (OBCs), may face
discrimination in many aspects of life in India. We therefore chose to send applications from
fictitious tenants belonging to four social categories - Upper-Caste Hindu (UC); Muslim, Scheduled
Caste (SC) and OBC.
We sent four queries to each landlord we contacted. Queries were sent using the online web
form (see Figure1 for a sample of the form in which the landlord received the web query) with
one fictitious candidate from each of these four categories applying to each landlord. Care was
taken not to send a flurry of applications, but rather to apply sequentially with time gaps between
applications. We randomised the order in which we sent the applications so that each social type
was equally likely to be first, second, third, or fourth to apply to a given landlord.
We used two names for each type, with both having common male first names beginning with
the letter ”A” and last names that denoted caste and religion (with Muslim applicants having
both first and last names that denoted their religion, since Muslims have distinctive first and last
names).8 All applicants were male. For our Scheduled Caste and Other Backward Caste names,
we relied on government lists of the castes included in these categories in Delhi and its surrounding
Hindi-speaking states for maximum signalling value. We also drew on previous qualitative work
carried out by Banerjee et al. (2009); they field-tested possible SC, Muslim and OBC names to
identify those most widely recognized by middle-class residents of Delhi.
Queries were identical except for the name and email of the applicant, which reflected the
assigned social type, the associated cellphone number (which was mated to type to aid clear as-
signment to social type) and the time and intra-ad order at which the query was sent which, as we
discuss above, was randomized to avoid order effects.
In all, we report results from landlord responses to 681 unique applicants to 171 apartments.
While our design was fully blocked, there was one instance where the listing was deleted in the
midst of sending the four applications. As a result, we sent OBC queries to 171 listings but UC,
6We intend to further explore both landlord and agent behavior and possible differences between them in a
companion study, currently in the pilot phase.
7We did attempt to over sample Muslim landlords. Since the flow of such advertisements is very sparse, in practice
that meant we sampled most of those landlords during the study period.
8The Hindu first names were Anil, Arun, and Amit; the Muslim first names were Abbas and Arif. The OBC
last names were Yadav and Ahir; the UC last names were Gupta and Sharma; the SC last names were Paswan and
Manjhi; and the Muslim last names were Khan and Ahmed.
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SC, and Muslim queries to 170. Because of this almost fully blocked design, we do not need to
worry about balance across social categories when it comes to listing and landlord characteristics.9
5.3 Data and Analysis
Apart from the details on the listings (e.g., square footage, monthly rent, location, etc.), our key
data come from whether, how often, and at what intervals the landlords to whom we sent queries
called our fictitious tenants.
Calls were received on cellphones carrying Indian SIM cards procured for this experiment. Each
SIM (i.e., each number) was mated permanently to a particular type (e.g., SC or Muslim). Call
log data was downloaded into Excel and coded into STATA to enable the analysis. Keeping count
of the number of callbacks and number of unique callers to each type of applicant was thus trivial.
We did not answer phone calls, so we do not have any direct way of gauging what landlords
were calling to say (except in cases where landlords also sent either a text or email, which was
only in a small minority of cases10). In many cases landlords called back multiple times, allowing
us to measure not just whether they called but how many times and how soon after the receipt
of an online application expressing in an interest in their apartment landlords called our fictitious
tenants.
However, it is not enough for our purposes to track simply the total number of unique numbers
that called back our different categories of tenants. There are two reasons for this. First, we need
to link callbacks to listings in order to analyze the effects of landlord and listing characteristics.
Secondly, there is a distinct possibility (borne out by our subsequent findings) that not all calls
received were in response to the queries we sent out, or at least not directly.
To elaborate, there was a strong possibility that some calls were spam, telemarketing calls,
or calls from brokers or agents whom we had not contacted but who had somehow got hold of
our fictitious tenants’ numbers and were calling to offer them their services. While including
such “spurious” calls in raw counts is not entirely uninformative (after all, it would be striking
if spammers, too, were more interested in some social categories than others), we need to focus
our estimates on genuine calls from landlords we applied to in order to make reliable inferences
about landlord behavior. In addition, calls that we cannot link to a listing cannot be used in our
regression estimates.
5.4 Tracing Callers
The difficulty of linking callbacks to listings was exacerbated by the fact that the majority of
listings do not list the landlord’s actual cellphone or land-line number. Rather, the housing portal
assigns them a masking number, presumably to protect themselves from spam and to protect their
9Later, we present a table showing the balance across applicant categories.
10It is worth noting that all texts or emails were simply requests for the prospective tenant to get in touch to discuss
the listing, so were ”affirmative callbacks” in the sense that the landlord was contacting the prospective tenant to
move the discussion further. No landlord emailed or texted to deny a prospective tenant a shot at his/her apartment.
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privacy.11 The portal’s practice is similar to that employed by online classified services in the US,
such as Craigslist, which provide users with a masking email so as to protect their privacy. Potential
tenants (and researchers) thus mostly see only a specially assigned number, dialling which connects
them to the advertiser’s actual number, which they (and we) do not see. In practice, this meant
that except for a small subset of those we applied to, we could not immediately link a callback to
a specific listing, since the callback came from the landlord’s actual number, and not the one on
the online listing, which is essentially a call-forwarding service.
However, the use of web-based call-tracking resources such as Truecaller12, publicly-available
information, and some supplemental calling back allowed us to solve this problem to a great extent.
We received callbacks from 118 unique numbers, whether landlines or cellphones. Of these,
we were conclusively able to identify 22 as either telemarketing calls, misdials or wrong numbers,
calls from property agents who appear to have gained access to our number, or (in one case) to
a homeowner other than one in our sample. We drop such spam calls (and the associated calling
numbers) from further analysis since none of these categories are informative about the preferences
and effort of the landlords in our sample.
Of the remaining 96 unique (potentially legitimate) numbers, we are able to conclusively estab-
lish that 89 (or 92.7%) correspond to a listing we applied to. We do this in four ways. First, some
landlords do list their actual numbers on the listing, making it trivial to link their callbacks to a
listing. Second, some landlords also emailed and identified themselves (and provided a number).
Third, Truecaller and other web-based search engines, together with the call logs that showed us
when a call from a given number was first received, enabled us to trace a large number of the re-
mainder. Finally, we carried out an intensive period of calling hitherto unidentified numbers back
about 10 days after the conclusion of the experiment (and about a month since most numbers had
first called) where we attempted to determine whether these numbers were in fact landlords we had
applied to, and if this was indeed the case, which listing each number corresponded to.13
The success of our tracing attempts makes us confident in asserting that any results we see
based only on traced calls (which are the only ones we can use in our regressions) are not driven by
differential success in tracing callers to different categories of applicants. It is worth noting that of
the 7 numbers we were unable to either trace to a landlord or tag as spam, 4 called only once. Only
3 numbers that called our experimental numbers more than once (a mere 2.5% of the 118 numbers
that called us at any point) are thus ones that remain untraceable and unclassifiable. Nonetheless,
to ensure that our results, which are based on traced calls only, are not driven by the call patterns
of these 7 untraceable numbers, we run a bounding exercise on our callback ratios to see how they
would change under assumptions chosen to go against our hypothesis.
11A reasonable concern, given that we found that many people we had not contacted had nevertheless got hold of
the phone numbers we employed in our experiment.
12https://www.truecaller.com
13For this, we used Skype numbers set up to show our experimental numbers as Caller IDs to dispel any concerns
call recipients might have about a non-India number showing up as calling about a flat in Delhi.
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6 Descriptive Statistics: Listings, Landlords, and Applicants
6.1 Listing and Landlord Characteristics
Table 1 provides an overview of the features of the properties in the sample. A large majority
of listings (71%) were for two- or three-bedroom apartments, with 20% were for one-bedroom
properties, and 9% had four bedrooms. The distribution of properties differed somewhat between
the city and suburbs, with fewer one-bedroom flats in the suburbs. As we would expect, city flats
were about one-and-a-half times more expensive per square foot (Rs. 28.5 psf compared with Rs.
18.1 psf in Gurgaon or NOIDA), and were smaller on average (at a little over 1100 sf, compared
with an ample 1600+ sf in the suburbs). We also report those landlord characteristics that we
were able to discern from names with a high degree of certainty, which were religion and gender.
About 12% of the landlords we applied to were Muslim, the lion’s share of these in the city. This is
slightly higher than Muslims’ share in the city’s population, which is estimated at around 10%.14
About 13% of our landlord sample was female.
6.2 Applicant and Application Characteristics
Table 2 provides an overview of application characteristics. Since our design was fully blocked, with
each listing receiving one application of each type (UC, SC, OBC and M) there can be no differences
in the proportion of each type applying to any kind of apartment or landlord. As discussed earlier,
the position of each type within the applicant pool for each listing was randomized to avoid order
effects, since it is possible that an applicant who applies before others may have an advantage. As
we see in Column (1) there are negligible differences in mean position of types within a listing.
As Columns (2) and (3) show, the staggered nature of our application procedure does introduce
some variation in when within the day or week a particular kind of applicant applied to rent a
property. OBC and SC applications were more likely to have been sent over the weekend and
outside of daytime hours in India. The likely effects of these differences are unclear. Perhaps the
most likely effect is on time to first response: it seems reasonable that a query sent within office
hours or on a weekday would be acted on immediately - although the opposite is also possible,
since this is personal work for landlords and may in fact be harder to attend to during work hours
or on a workday. Indeed, queries received during work hours are more likely to be missed due to
inattention. Thus, while it is not clear whether and how these differences in sending time matter,
we control for them in some specifications. Our findings will be informative for future audit studies,
which could seek to maximize response rates by optimizing sending times. Finally, we expect that
applications to older listings would, ceteris paribus, elicit less response. Again, due to the fully
blocked design, the average gap between the application date and the listing date is about the same
across the four categories.
14As noted before, the actual share of Muslim landlords in the flow of listings was much smaller; we oversampled
the Muslim landlords.
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7 Results
It is instructive to first discuss the patterns in the raw counts of calls, callers, and all responses
(inclusive of emails and texts.)
Table 3 displays raw counts of responders and responses by applicant type. Column 1 of Panel
A presents the count of all unique calling numbers by type, and appears to suggest that there is a
large callback differential between UC applicants and all other types. However, our tracing exercise
tempers these conclusions somewhat. As we can see from the move between Column 1 and Column
2, part of the UC-vs-Others differential in Column 1 is due to the fact that our UC applicants were
spammed more.
This is, of course, interesting in its own right, particularly because some of the spam callers
were in fact property agents whom we did not contact, but who contacted our fictitious tenants
independently, while others presumably wanted to offer good or services. We do not explore this
issue further here, although we flag it for future research. For our purposes, we must exclude
those numbers we identify as belonging to unsolicited callers (uncontacted brokers or landlords,
telemarketers, etc.) from the analysis. This substantially narrows what initially seems to be a large
callback differential between UC and SC, for example.
After we exclude the spam callers, we are able to match most of the remaining calling numbers
to landlords in our sample, as discussed above. Column (3) contains the counts of the landlords
we could trace among the callers. Untraceable numbers are not the only source of the differences
between Columns 2 and 3 in Panel A of Table 3. It is worth noting that 13 landlords called from two
numbers each, explaining why the numbers in Column 3 are so much smaller than those in Column
2. Once Column 3 is supplemented by information about landlords who texted or emailed, we get
the total number of landlords who responded in Column (6). These numbers are our fundamental
raw data for the results presented in the remainder of this section. As Column (6) shows, roughly
similar numbers of landlords respond to upper-castes and SC applicants. Somewhat fewer respond
to OBCs, and substantially fewer to Muslims.
Panel B of Table 3 displays analogous counts for the number of calls, emails, and texts. Since
we did not answer calls, landlords (or others) could persist in calling applicants. In many cases they
did, leading to a much larger number of calls than callers. The relevant numbers are, again, Column
6, which measures the total number of non-spam contacts received by each type. Here, we continue
to see a big difference between UC and Muslim, with UC applicants receiving 60% more calls than
Muslim applicants. We also see a substantial difference between UC and SCs here, despite there
being no difference at all in the number of callers: UCs receive 18% more calls than SCs, despite
being called by almost exactly the same number of landlords. Finally, we should note that while
we see that OBCs receive more calls than even UCs, this is driven entirely by one landlord who
called only the OBC applicant 33 times.
Result 1: Landlords are significantly less likely to respond to Muslims applicants.
Our central result can be seen from Table 4, which presents differences in mean response rates
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(defined as the percentage of landlords who either called, texted, or emailed an applicant) between
our UC applicant and others. While the probability of a landlord responding to the UC applicant
is 0.35, the corresponding probability is 0.22 for Muslim applicants. The difference of 0.13 is
statistically significant at conventional levels of significance. A simple way to scale this difference
is by calculating the number of landlords each type must contact in order to have a pool of 10
apartments to consider. Whereas an UC applicant needs to send out just under 29 queries to hear
from 10 landlords, a Muslim applicant needs to send out nearly 45 queries to achieve the same
degree of interest. Muslims must therefore expend considerably greater time and effort, including
search time, to have access to a similar-sized pool of potential rental properties as upper castes.
The regression counterpart of these results can be found in Table 5, which presents OLS regres-
sions for the probability of being called back at the applicant level. The coefficients of interest are
those on the dummy variables for each applicant type. Once again we see that a Muslim candidate
is about 12.4% points less likely to be contacted by a landlord than an UC candidate, and that this
coefficient is highly statistically significant. This result survives the addition of controls for sending
patterns and is essentially unchanged by a specification that uses landlord fixed effects.
Result 2: Relative to UC applicants, Muslim applicants receive fewer callbacks
but landlords who do respond, make similar number of attempts to contact UC and
Muslim applicants.
As discussed earlier, the fact that we do not answer calls means that landlords make multiple
attempts to contact those applicants they are interesting in pursuing. We can thus use the number
of calls and other forms of contact (and not just the number of callers, which has been our key
measure so far) as an additional measure of landlord interest.
In Table 4, we present the mean count of landlord responses per application by each applicant
type. This number is 0.82 for UCs and 0.48 for Muslims. The difference of 0.34 per listing is
strongly statistically significant. Put differently, a Muslim applicant would need to send about 21
expressions of interest to get 10 callbacks, whereas an UC candidate would only need to send just
over 12. Muslims must expend significantly greater time and effort to elicit a comparable number
of calls. However, once we condition on landlords who respond, UC applicants receive about the
same number of callbacks as Muslim applicants.
Table 6 implements regressions using the count of responses rather than merely the probability
of being called back. The coefficient on the Muslim dummy is negative and statistically significant,
indicating that Muslims get 0.58 fewer responses.
Result 3: Differences in the probability of response and count of responses between
UC and SC /OBC types are not statistically significant.
As the rows for OBCs and SCs in Tables 4. 5, and 6 show, we do find statistically significant
evidence of discrimination against these two types as compared to UCs. The probability that a
landlord contacts an OBC applicant is 0.30 (see Table 4), which is lower than the 0.35 for an UC
applicant. The difference of 0.05 is not, however, statistically significant at conventional levels. The
corresponding difference between UC and SC is a trivial 0.01. Almost exactly as many landlords
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call our SC applicants back as call back our upper-caste applicants.
This pattern is replicated in the corresponding columns for the mean number of callbacks. OBCs
have a higher number of callbacks in aggregate (and therefore per listing), but the difference is not
statistically significant.15 The point estimate of the difference between mean number of callbacks
for SCs and UCs points to a disadvantage for SCs but is once again statistically indistinguishable
from zero.
The regressions in Table 5 confirm this finding. The coefficient on the OBC dummy for the
probability of being called back is negative but not significant. The one for the SC dummy is
positive but statistically and economically insignificant. There are also no significant results for
OBCs and SCs when it comes to the response count (Table 6).
A caveat to these three results is in order, however. Recall that our regressions and callback
ratios are constrained to use only data from the 89 numbers (and emails and texts) which called
our experimental numbers that were neither spam/unrelated to our experiment, nor untraceable.
We dropped 22 numbers that called one or more of our applicant categories from the analysis
because they were not from landlords whom we contacted. While some of these were pure spam
or telemarketing, we identified 12 of these numbers as belonging either to property agents or a
potential landlord offering a different apartment or house than the ones applied for during our
audit. There is of course no way to map these unsolicited callers to listings, or indeed to know
whether these individuals received information about all 4 of our applicants or only a sub-set. But
it is suggestive that while 6 of such agents/landlords called an UC applicant, only one of them
called an SC applicant.
Result 4: There is suggestive evidence that landlords who respond to both UC and
Muslim (or SC) applicants are more likely to call UCs sooner as compared to Muslims
(SC).
Table 7 looks at the length of time that elapsed between our fictitious applicant sending an
online query to a landlord and the first time the landlord contacted the applicant. Our results,
while not statistically significant (in part due to the pairwise regressions only being able to utilize
those listings where a landlord responded to both types in the pair), are suggestive. The point
estimates suggest that landlords wait about 6.5 hours longer before calling a Muslim applicant
than they do for an upper-caste candidate. The results for SC candidates are smaller in magnitude
but of the same sign. Both groups, therefore, likely would need to search longer for housing before
being able to find a place to rent.
Table 8 displays the findings from a related analysis that investigates whether landlords who
respond to two types are more likely to respond first to one type over the other. One hypothesis
is that to whom the landlord first responds is independent of the order in which the applications
were received. In this case, the null (assuming no bias) is that the proportion of landlords who
first respond to a given type in a pair is 0.5 (in half the cases, the landlords should respond to
one type, and in the other half to the other type.) A more plausible hypothesis (again assuming
15Recall that one of the landlords called the OBC applicant 33 times.
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no bias) is that landlords simply respond in the same order in which they receive applications.
We test the pairwise response patterns against the two nulls in Table 8. As before, since we are
restricted to landlords who responded to both types in a pair, we have diminished statistical power.
Nevertheless, there is some suggestion that landlords who respond to both UCs and SCs, first call
UCs (almost significant at 10%).
Result 5: There is heterogeneity by gender and religion of landlord, and by size
and rental price of the listed property in the likelihood of response to the various
applicant types
Table 9 displays the results of regressing interactions of landlord and property features with
applicant type, on the likelihood of response. Although the small proportion of female or muslim
landlords points to limited statistical power, we still find some interesting patterns. First, female
landlords are about 13.4% points more likely to respond to an SC applicant. Second, muslim
landlords are 22% points less likely to respond at all (the corresponding point estimate for females
is about -16% but borderline insignificant at the 10% level.) Third, landlords offering 1-bedroom
properties are 20% points less likely to respond to Muslims. As a rule, applicants to 1-bedroom
properties tend to be single men or women. Since all our applicants are male, this implies that the
housing rental market is especially hostile to single Muslim men.
8 Discussion, Interpretation and Conclusion
Our results indicate that Muslims in particular face serious disadvantages in the search for rental
housing. To get an expression of interest from 10 landlords, a UC applicant has to apply to about
29 listings while Muslim applicant must apply to almost 45 listings - about 60% more. Although we
lack statistical power, point estimates suggest discrimination on other dimensions as well. Landlords
who do respond to Muslim applicants as well as UC applicants, tend to respond sooner to UCs,
and call more frequently. We do not believe that our findings are biased by the inability to trace
the identity of some callers. A simple bounding exercise confirms that even with conservative
assumptions about the untraced callers, about 50% more landlords respond to UCs as compared
to Muslims. We also find that landlords offering 1-bedroom properties are particularly reluctant
to respond to Muslim applicants. Since male applicants for 1-bedroom properties are commonly
perceived to be single men, this suggests that single Muslim men may be finding it especially
challenging to find suitable housing in Delhi and its suburbs.
Our paper complements and extends the findings of Thorat et al. (2015). They too find sig-
nificant discrimination against Muslims. But they also find evidence of discrimination against SCs
while we do not find any statistically significant difference in the ratio of landlords who respond
to UCs v. SCs. However, the two studies use very different audit techniques are the findings are
not easily comparable. Thorat et al. (2015) employ telephonic or face-to-face audits, and landlords
may be loathe to overtly discriminate in such settings. Note for instance, that 99.7% of the UC
applicants in their studies received a positive response while only 33% of the UC applicants in our
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study received a response. In a sense, the two studies are looking at discrimination at different
points in the search process, and are in effect looking at different samples. For instance, one could
imagine Thorat et al. (2015) as studying the subsequent interaction between landlords and the
33% of our UC sample who were contacted by a landlord. Alternatively, the Thorat et al. (2015)
landlord sample may not be using the online market, and thus could differ from ours.
Why then do their findings match ours for Muslim applicants? Interviewer effects may also
come in play (see Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003)). While we can only speculate absent further
information on the details of how caste and religion were signalled in the other study, we should
note that there may have been differences in the extent to which landlords were able to discern
the caste/religion of the potential tenant in that study and in this one. Whereas our study relies
entirely on landlords picking up on the import of a set of last names, Thorat et al. (2015) had
more flexibility in how affiliations were signalled. For instance, to signal ”Muslim” identity, did
the auditors consciously or unconsciously dress and behave in a “stereotypical” fashion, which in
turn could have evoked negative responses from landlords? Such stereotypes may be harder to
convey for SC applicants. Another reason could be that in our study landlords were clearly able to
identify Muslims but may not have been as certain about the caste identity of the SC names. Given
that our study relies on landlords associating particular surnames with caste groups, inattentiveness
towards last names could have reduced caste recognition among landlords in our study while leaving
Muslims, who had distinctive first and last names, unaffected. Finally, it is plausible that with a
larger sample and 100% call tracing, we would have also found significant effects for OBCs and
SCs.
Online housing markets offer anonymity and flexibility, making them convenient platforms to
conduct “clean” discrimination audits. Understanding discrimination in such settings is also in-
creasingly policy relevant, as more markets and transactions move online, even in urban settings in
the developing world, such as the one we study. There are important questions about how discrim-
ination manifests itself in online settings that facilitate anonymity. In our context, landlords may
be more comfortable in discriminating online than they would be in person. In turn, disadvantaged
groups may evolve different coping strategies. Specialised markets or agents may emerge who assist
the disadvantaged in finding housing. Alternatively, disadvantaged applicants may seek to “dis-
guise” their identity in order to at least get the proverbial “foot through the door”. Yet another
question is how much of the observed discrimination is taste based versus statistical. If the latter
plays a major role, signalling strategies must adapt to the online setting. In addition, there are
quirks that may be idiosyncratic to the Indian setting. For instance, dietary preferences are often
cited a major reason to discriminate across tenants - many upper caste landlords are vegetarian,
and prefer vegetarian tenants. Many of these questions will be explored in the ongoing companion
study.
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Figure 1: Online Rental Application Form
Source: Screenshot of the form that pops up when an applicant clicks on an advertised property
on one of India’s leading housing portal; taken in May 2015.
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Table 1: Listing & Landlord Summary Statistics
Delhi City Suburbs1 All
House characteristics
Num bedrooms:2
1 0.26 0.10 0.20
2 or 3 0.67 0.78 0.71
4+ 0.07 0.12 0.09
Rent (Rs) 36100.90 29333.32 33726.31
(53348.86) (24292.45) (45353.01)
Floor area (Sq ft) 1138.92 1616.93 1306.64
(654.86) (702.55) (707.91)
Rent/sq. ft 28.47 18.12 24.84
(20.74) (10.37) (18.45)
Landlord characteristics
% Female3 0.14 0.10 0.13
% Muslim4 0.16 0.03 0.12
N 111 60 171
Standard errors in parenthesis.
1 Suburbs - Gurgaon and NOIDA.
2 1-1.5 bedrooms coded as 1 bedroom, 2-3.5 as 2-3 bedrooms.
3 We were unable to code gender for13 of the 171 landlords (due to
missing first name e.g. only initial). The reported female % is com-
puted over all 171 landlords.
4 We were unable to code religion for 1 of the 171 landlords. The
reported muslim % is computed over all 171 landlords.
Table 2: Application Summary Statistics
Order Daytime Weekday Gap (days) N
UC 2.49 0.84 0.59 4.05 170
(1.11) (0.37) (0.49) (7.59)
OBC 2.50 0.74 0.51 4.09 171
(1.12) (0.44) (0.50) (7.58)
SC 2.47 0.72 0.51 4.08 170
(1.12) (0.45) (0.50) (7.61)
M 2.51 0.84 0.59 4.03 170
(1.13) (0.37) (0.49) (7.60)
Standard errors in parenthesis.
Order is the chronological position of the applicant type within
the set of 4 applications sent to each landlord.
Daytime: 6:01AM-18:59PM; Weekday: Mon-Fri.
Gap is number of days between date of applying and date the ad
was posted.
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Table 3: Counts of Responders & Responses
A. Counts of Responders
Unique Callers Landlords who
Total Excl. spam Called1 Texted Emailed Responded2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
UC 80 66 56 5 2 59
OBC 67 59 50 6 2 51
SC 63 58 55 4 3 58
M 52 40 35 4 3 38
B. Counts of Responses
Traced to landlords:
All calls Excl. spam Calls Texts Emails Total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
UC 192 157 132 5 2 139
OBC 165 149 142 6 2 150
SC 126 112 111 4 3 118
M 101 80 75 4 3 82
1 In Panel A, Column (3) differs from (2) because some numbers cannot be traced,
and because some landlords called from more than one number.
2 In Panel A, Column (6) is not the sum of (3)-(5) since some landlords both, called
and texted or emailed.
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Table 5: Probability of Response by Landlord
(1) (2) (3)
Muslim -0.124*** -0.124*** -0.124***
[0.034] [0.034] [0.039]
OBC -0.049 -0.04 -0.039
[0.032] [0.032] [0.037]
SC -0.006 0.005 0.003
[0.034] [0.034] [0.040]
Order=21 0.018 0.018
[0.030] [0.034]
Order=3 -0.021 -0.007
[0.033] [0.047]
Order=4 0.017 0.028
[0.034] [0.049]
Gap (days)2 -0.009*** -0.021
[0.003] [0.034]
Weekday (Mon-Fri) 0.081 0.129*
[0.056] [0.065]
Daytime (6AM-6:59PM) 0.032 -0.031
[0.061] [0.065]
Suburbs 0.014
[0.066]
2-3 beds 0.101
[0.065]
4+ beds 0.381***
[0.115]
Rent (Rs/sqft) -0.003**
[0.001]
Landlord FE x
Constant 0.347*** 0.269** 0.369***
[0.037] [0.106] [0.120]
Observations 681 681 681
R-squared 0.012 0.079 0.671
OLS regression coefficients (linear probability models); the dependant
variable is a dummy for any response from the landlord.
Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered on landlord.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
1 Order is the chronological position of the applicant within the set of 4
applications to a landlord.
2 Gap in days between date application sent, and date ad posted.
27
Table 6: Count of Responses by Landlords
(1) (2) (3)
Muslim -0.528*** -0.531*** -0.531***
[0.146] [0.146] [0.147]
OBC 0.07 0.175 0.092
[0.263] [0.273] [0.220]
SC -0.164 -0.064 -0.136
[0.142] [0.161] [0.134]
Order=21 -0.268 -0.237
[0.220] [0.202]
Order=3 -0.513* -0.352
[0.295] [0.277]
Order=4 -0.503* -0.412
[0.296] [0.298]
Gap (days)2 -0.058*** -0.236
[0.017] [0.182]
Weekday (Mon-Fri) 0.28 0.409
[0.309] [0.299]
daytime (6AM-6:59PM) 0.453 0.212
[0.280] [0.281]
Suburbs -0.269
[0.265]
2-3 beds 0.036
[0.472]
4+ beds 0.694
[0.522]
Rent (Rs/sqft) -0.017**
[0.008]
Ad fixed effect x
Constant -0.201 0.106 -19.081***
[0.142] [0.618] [1.290]
Observations 681 681 681
Poisson regression coefficients (dep. variable is count of responses to an
applicant)
Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered on landlord.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
1 Order is the chronological position of the applicant within the set of 4
applications to a landlord.
2 Gap in days between date application sent, and date ad posted.
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Table 8: Pairwise Comparison: Who Receives the First Response?
Type 1 Type 1 Null Null
Type 1 v 2 N1 1st applied2 1st response3 Hypothesis 14 p-value Hypothesis 25 p-value
UC v OBC 39 0.46 0.54 0.5 0.63 0.46 0.33
UC v SC 42 0.52 0.64 0.5 0.07 0.52 0.12
UC v M 31 0.61 0.65 0.5 0.11 0.61 0.71
OBC v SC 44 0.45 0.61 0.5 0.13 0.45 0.03
OBC v M 23 0.43 0.57 0.5 0.53 0.43 0.21
SC v M 29 0.41 0.52 0.5 0.85 0.41 0.26
1 Number of landlords who responded to both types (includes those who responded to others as well.)
2 The fraction of landlords to whom Type 1 applied to before Type 2.
3 The fraction of landlords that responded to Type 1 before Type 2.
4 The null is that landlords first respond to either type independent of the order in which the types apply.
5 The null is that landlords first respond to the two types in the same order in which the types apply.
Table 9: Probability of Response: Interactions of Applicant type with Land-
lord/Property Features
Interacting characteristic of landlord/property (Z):
Female Muslim One bed High price
Z -0.157 -0.224* -0.139 -0.146**
[0.095] [0.130] [0.085] [0.073]
OBC -0.043 -0.043 -0.06 -0.110**
[0.034] [0.035] [0.040] [0.043]
OBC*Z -0.048 -0.015 0.039 0.044
[0.088] [0.081] [0.031] [0.048]
SC -0.018 -0.007 0.002 -0.049
[0.038] [0.037] [0.041] [0.046]
SC*Z 0.134* 0.091 0.015 0.069
[0.078] [0.105] [0.060] [0.052]
Muslim -0.140*** -0.140*** -0.105*** -0.184***
[0.037] [0.038] [0.039] [0.046]
Muslim*Z 0.036 -0.005 -0.200*** -0.052
[0.077] [0.008] [0.070] [0.049]
Constant 0.289*** 0.276*** 0.305*** 0.338***
[0.083] [0.080] [0.083] [0.090]
Observations 630 677 681 681
R-squared 0.041 0.049 0.055 0.044
Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered on landlord.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
OLS regressions at the applicant level (linear probability model)
Controls include the rank order of the applicant with the application set, week-
day dummy, daytime dummy, gap in days between date ad posted and date
application sent.
30
